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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah

Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (Supp. 1983):
(a)

Properly bars plaintiff's claim for failing to

bring such claim within the time prescribed by the Act,
(b)

Properly conforms to the open courts and equal

protection provisions of the Utah Constitution, Article 1,
Sections 11 and 24, under the facts of this case; and
(c)

Properly conforms to the due process clause of

the Utah Constitution and/or the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a medical malpractice action brought on behalf of a
six year old child to recover damages for injuries he allegedly
sustained as the result of negligent diagnosis and treatment.
(Record at 5.)
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted respondent's motion for judgment on
the pleadings for the reason that appellants' claims are barred
by the statute of limitations set forth by the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann., § 78-14-4 (Supp. 1983).
(Record at 71-72.)

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Nathan Lee Garza was born on August 16, 1979.

Nearly one

year later on August 1, 1980, Suzanne Lee, Nathan's mother had
Nathan examined by Dr. Lindsey of Provo, Utah, who referred the
patient to Dr. Lynn Gaufin, a neurosurgeon.

(Record at 29.)

Defendant, Dr. Gaufin examined plaintiff, Nathan Lee Garza, on
August 13, 1980, August 29, 1980, and October 24, 1980, and has
provided no treatment to plaintiffs since that time.

(Record

at 13.)
Nathan's mother, Suzanne Lee is a responsible parent, who
after becoming aware of the severity of her son's condition,
not only sought medical treatment for him, but also sought to
pursue any legal remedy available to him by retaining Provo
attorney, Dean Zabriskie to represent Nathan.

(Record at 30.)

Dean Zabriskie filed a Notice of Claim on behalf of Nathan
Garza on May 6, 1983 (R. 12, 30.)

Although this filing may

have been timely, Mrs. Lee instructed Mr. Zabriskie to drop the
case completely.

(Record at 30.)

Despite the fact that Mrs. Lee was aware of her son's condition and had already instructed one attorney to drop the
case, Mrs. Lee commenced this action by filing a complaint on
March 8, 1985, more than four years after the rendering of
health care of which plaintiffs complain.

(Record at 19.)

Defendant, Dr. Gaufin moved for judgment on the pleadings
in the lower court on the ground that the Utah Health Care
-2-

Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann., § 78-14-4 (Supp. 1983) bars
plaintiffs' claim.

(Record at 16.) The lower court, the

Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen presiding, after a full and
fair hearing, granted defendant's motion and entered judgment
accordingly.

(Record at 71-72.)

This appeal followed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In 1976, the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act to protect the public from adverse effects of
the rising incidence and cost of medical malpractice claims.
This Court on several prior occasions has upheld the constitutionality of the Act, including its statute of limitations
which applies equally to all persons.
The Legislature's prerogative to determine whether a
statute of limitations applies or is tolled with respect to
minors claims is well settled.

Minors have no constitutional

rights beyond others and are not inherently entitled to exemption from the operation of a statute of limitations.

The

legislative intent to meet the public needs is unequivocally
clear:

it is in the public's interest that minors claims

against health care providers be timely filed.

Legislative

intent distinguishes this circumstance from the court decisions
in other cases upon which appellant relies, demonstrating that
the Act conforms with the requirements of the Utah "open
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courts" and equal protection provisions by allowing timely
minors* claims to be brought.
In harmony with federal and foreign state decisions, this
Court has consistently applied a rational basis test to determine that the act constitutionally assures guarantees equal
protection and access to the courts.

This Court determined

that the Legislature may properly treat health care providers
as a separate class, and it is evident that equal treatment of
minors and adults concerning operation of the statute of limitations reasonably furthers the Legislature's objectives.
Therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 is constitutional.
The claims asserted in this lawsuit commenced more than
four years after the physician last saw the patient and are
properly barre_ as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY ENTERED JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS FOR DEFENDANT BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS* CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE UTAH HEALTH
CARE MALPRACTICE ACT AND ITS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Under Utah law, a medical malpractice action against a
health care provider must be commenced within two years of the
date when the patient or plaintiff discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered that he has
suffered a legal injury, but not to exceed four years from the

-4-

alleged negligent act.

Utah Code Ann. §

78-14-4 (Supp. 1983);

Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979).

This statute of

limitations is part of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act,
L. 1976 ch. 23 (the "Act"), and applies equally to "all
persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) (Supp. 1983).
The lower court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor
of the defendant on the ground that the minor plaintiff's
claim, filed over four years after it arose is barred by the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (Supp. 1983).

By enter-

ing its judgment on the pleadings, the lower court rejected the
same constitutional attacks which plaintiff reasserts on appeal,
A.

Utah Case Law Supports the Constitutionality Of
Section 78-14-4 Of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act.

Utah courts have strongly and consistently upheld the constitutionality of the provisions of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act "to protect and insure the continued availability of health care services to the public . . . ."

Allen v.

Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 31-32 (Utah
1981).

See also Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d

352 (Utah 1980); McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center,
603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979); and Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919
(Utah 1978) .

-5-

Likewise, federal courts reviewing the constitutionality of
Section 78-14-4 of the Act uniformly sustain its validity for
the reason that the medical malpractice statutes do not violate
constitutional due process rights of injured infants or their
parents.

Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152, 155-56 (D. Utah

1984) .
This Court's decision in Allen v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., is representative of the support this Court gives
to enactments by the Utah Legislature in the area of medical
malpractice.

In Allen this Court unanimously rejected the

plaintiff's argument that the shortened statute of limitations
for medical malpractice cases violates constitutional guarantees of equal protection.

Indeed, this Court held that:

(1) the Utah Legislature's exercise of discretionary prerogative would ensure continued availability of health care services and (2) such action does not exceed constitutional prohibitions.

Allen, 635 P.2d at 32.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that Allen is constitutional to the
extent that the legislature may reasonably limit the time for
filing adult's medical malpractice claims, but argue that the
legislature may not limit minor's claims because the limitation
as applied to minors allegedly violates the Utah Constitution,
Article I, Sections 11 and 24.
However, plaintiffs' argument fails to consider the fundamental principle that the legislature may place minors on equal
-6-

footing with adults without affecting constitutional rights.
The United States Supreme Court declared in Vance v. Vance, 108
U.S. 514 (1883):
The Constitution of the United States . . . gives
to minors no special rights beyond others, and it is
within the legislative competency of the State . . .
to make exceptions in their favor or not. (emphasis
added.)
In harmony with the Supreme Court's declaration, the court
in Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 413 N.E.2d 891, 893 (Ind. 1980)
stated that the legislature is not under any constitutional
mandate to suspend operation of statutes of limitation in cases
of infancy or incapacity.

Likewise, the general rule of law as

stated in 51 Am. Jur. 2d 750, Limitation of Actions § 182
(1970) points out that minority does not per se bestow immunity
upon an infant or his guardian without a legislative saving in
his favor, and a statute of limitations will ordinarily run
against the claims of infants in the absence of a contrary
statute.
Plaintiff's attempt to single out minors as a separate
class from the protected or affected groups is inappropriate.
As discussed above, minors do not have any constitutional right
to different treatment before the law than their adult counterparts.

See, e.g. 54 C.J.S. 262, Limitations of Actions § 235.

"Exemptions ordinarily granted to infants do not rest on any
fundamental doctrine of the law, but on the legislative will
expressed in the statutes; infants may be put on the same
-7-

footing as adults in this respect, and unless excepted they so
stand . . . .

M

Id.

In this case it is absolutely clear that the intent of the
1976 Utah Legislature was to place adults and minors on equal
footing with respect to the operation of the Statue of Limitations for medical malpractice claims.

The provision was even

amended by the 1979 legislature to ensure that no one could
mistake the legislature's intent following the Court's decision
in Scott v. School Board of Granite School District, discussed
infra at Point 1(D). The legislature's decision to place
minors on the same footing as adults is within its prerogative
and is not a constitutional infringement of minors' rights.
The United States District Court for the District of Utah
recently reaffirmed the Vance "equal footing" principle in
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984).

In that

decision the federal court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendant health care providers, holding that the minor
plaintiff's claim was barred by the medical malpractice statute
of limitations.

The court's opinion recognizes as "universally

accepted" the rule that a "legislature may put adults and
infants on the same footing with respect to statutes of limitation without affecting constitutional rights."
F. Supp. at 156.

Hargett, 598

Thus, the Hargett court rejected the same

constitutional attack raised on this appeal.

-8-

Other federal courts have reached the same conclusion concerning the operation of statutes of limitation against minors*
claims.

In Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971, 972 (10th

Cir. 1980) the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
M

[I]t is well established that a claimant's minority does not

toll the running of the statute of limitations under the
Federal Tort Claims Act."

In Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d

578, 579 (9th Cir. 1965), the court stated that minority does
not toll the statute of limitations, and the parents or guardians of a minor must preserve his claim by timely action.
Finally, in Pittman v. United States, 341 F.2d 739, 741 (9th
Cir.), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965), the Supreme Court
found that equal protection guarantees are not violated by
applying shortened statute of limitations to a minor's claim.
In summary, state and federal case precedents demonstrate
that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's statute of limitations, which places adults and minors on equal footing, is a
constitutional exercise of legislative prerogative and a
rational response to the stated legislative purpose of insuring
the continued availability of medical care, while addressing
the medical malpractice insurance crisis and its attendant
effect upon the quality of health care in Utah.
§ 78-14-2 (1977).

-9-

Utah Code Ann.

B.

Section 78-14-4 does not bar minors' claims.

Plaintiffs suggest that § 78-14-4 "abrogates the common law
right a minor has to recover for personal injuries" under the
Utah Constitution.

However, minors (3o have access to the

courts as demonstrated by current statistics which are established by appellant's own cited authorities:

(1) One-seventh

(1/7) of all medical malpractice claims involve minors;
Jenkens, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act,
An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 829, 960-61
(1979); and (2) courts recognize that most claims of minors
will be brought quickly.

Barrio v. San Manuel Division

Hospital for Magma Copper Co., 692 P.2d 280, 286 (Ariz. 1984).
In Utah, assuming that one-seventh of the 30 malpractice
claims being filed each month are brought by minors, 51
malpractice claims are being brought by minors within the
statutory period each year.

In contrast, only three tardy

claims, stating constitutional challenges against Section
78-14-4 have surfaced in the ten year period since Section
78-14-4 was enacted in 1976.

Dee Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F.

Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984); Blum v. Stone, Case No. 20288 (currently pending before the Utah Supreme Court); and the instant
case.
Furthermore, it is evident that minors' medical malpractice
claims are being both heard and vindicated in Utah courts with
increasingly greater damage recoveries being awarded.
-10-

Recently, a Utah jury awarded $4,775,000 to the mother of a
child who was born a spastic quadriplegic because of an attending physician's misuse of a labor inducing drug.

Jury Verdict

Research Inc. Personal Injury Verdict Survey, Utah Edition 7
(1983).

In Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832

(Utah 1984), this court affirmed a $1.5 million jury verdict in
a products liability action brought by the parents of Elizabeth
Ann Barson, who suffered serious birth defects resulting from
negligent prenatal administration of a progestational drug.
These and other cases, coupled with the number of timely
claims made by Utah minors demonstrate that

the Utah courts'

doors1 are open to all medical malpractice claims whether
brought by adults or on behalf of minors.

Section 78-14-4 does

not violate the Article I, Section 11 open courts provision.
Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 156.
Additionally, Plaintiffs' argument that the protection of
the tolling statute is needed for minors whose parents or
guardians are ignorant or unmotivated has no application in

Article I, Section 11 provides: "All courts shall be open,
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself
or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.

-11-

this case.

Indeed, plaintiffs approached an attorney concern-

ing the matter within the statutory period, but later elected
to drop the matter completely,

(Record at 12, 30.)

There is

simply no justification to now permit the action to be brought
after the statutory period has elapsed.

The possibility that

some minors may not have effective or alert guardians does not
raise an issue of constitutional significance.
The United States Supreme Court stated that "our constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is "the
mere creature of the state and . . . historically [the law] has
recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act
in the best interest of their children.

Parham v. J.R., 442

U.S. 584, 602 (1979); and "parents naturally take an interest
in the welfare of their children--an interest that is particularly strong where a normal family relationship exists and
where the child is living with one or both parents."

Bellotti

v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 648 (1979).
Section 78-14-4 should not fail simply because its operation is not in all counts perfect; the legislature is entitled
to proceed in accordance with its appraisal of the greatest
good for the greatest number.

Thus, it is this court's duty to

uphold Section 78-14-4 as against constitutional challenge,
unless unconstitutionality is firmly demonstrated.

-12-

C.

Section 78-14-4 Is Constitutional Because It Reasonably Protects Against Social And Economic Evils While
Preserving The Continued Ava]Liability of Health Care
In Utah.

The thrust of plaintiffs' argument on appeal is that this
Court should wield Article I Section 11 powers under the Utah
Constitution to restrict the legislature's power, to apply
Section 78-14-4 to minors unless there is a "[1] clear social
or economic evil to be eliminated and [2] the elimination of a
remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving
the objective."

Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp., 25 Utah Adv.

Rep. 30, 36 (Case No. 17694) (December 31, 1985) and appellant's brief at 5.

Plaintiff also contends that there is no

medical malpractice insurance crisis to serve as a legislative
justification for enacting Section 78-x4-4 and, thus, there is
no evil to be eliminated or reasonable objective underlying the
Act.
Plaintiffs' arguments, however, are misplaced because
Section 78-14-4 is necessary to:

(1) eliminate both social and

economic evils, and (2) provide adequate and reasonable means
of insuring continued availability of health care services to
the public in Utah.
1.

Section 78-14-4 is Necessary to Eliminate Social and
economic evils.
a.

Prompt presentations of claims is necessary.

The legislature's justification for creating a shortened
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statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims remains
equally valid today as when it was enac ed.

One of the pur-

poses of the Act's statute of limitations is to encourage
prompt presentation of claims so that the alleged tort-feasor
has a fair opportunity to defend against malpractice claims.
In United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. Ill (1979) the Court
stated:
When any alleged tort feasor is required to
defend a claim long after the alleged wrong has occurred, the ability to successfully do so is diminished
by reason of dimmed memories, the death of witnesses,
and lost documents. As the years between injury and
suit increase, so does the probability that the search
for truth at trial will be impeded and contorted to
the benefit of the plaintiff. This harm can be
exacerbated where the injured party continues to grow,
develop and change, both physically and mentally,
after the injury complained of has occurred. . . .
See also Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585,
604 (Ind. 1980).

This Court has likewise acknowledged that

special protection is needed against the filing of tardy
medical malpractice claims, and that the medical malpractice
statute limitations has the salutary effect of "adequately
shielding health care providers from claims against which it
may be difficult to defend because of the lapse of
time. . . .b.

Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 149 (Utah 1979).
Non-tolling statutes make standard of care determinations feasible.

The legislature properly recognized the need to treat
medical malpractice claims differently from other general tort
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actions with respect to the operation of the statute of limitations*

Tolling a statute of limitations in a medical mal-

practice case creates an insurmountable problem of trying to
determine the applicable standard of care long after the treatment and injury occur.
Advances in knowledge and technology occur so rapidly in
medicine that state-of-the-art treatment today is likely to be
considered archaic in the very near future.

Medicine is indeed

a constant losing battle against obsolescence.

It is unreason-

able to assume that a court or jury can determine the applicable standard of care with any degree of fairness years after
the fact.

Furthermore, it would be impossible for jurors to

fairly assess the physician's actions based upon an ancient
standard of care without taking into account their personal
knowledge of advances which have occurred during the lapse in
time which make older techniques of treatment seem inappropriate or fraught with negligence.
c.

Absent Section 78-14-4 continued availability of
health care in Utah is seriously threatened.

Stale claims and standard of care determination problems
are compounded in this case because Nathan Garza is a minor and
mentally retarded.

(Record at 30.)

Even after Nathan Garza

reaches majority he will still be unable and legally incompetent to make decisions concerning his own legal rights. He
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will remain unable to initiate legal proceedings on his own
behalf.
If plaintiff's argument is accepted, the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim for Nathan Garza and
others similarly situated may never commence to run, and an
action on their behalf could be instituted decades after the
cause of action allegedly arises.

The potential liability of

health care providers and the exposure to liability of professional malpractice liability insurers becomes increasingly
unpredictable and indefinite.
Because the insurance industry depends on predictability to
determine premiums and maintain sufficient reserves, many
insurers would respond to the threat of uncertainty and problems related to defending against stale claims by withdrawing
from malpractice liability insurance markets.
Indiana Medical Malpractice Act:

Note, The

Legislative Surgery on

Patient's Rights, 10 Vol. Val. U. L. Rev. 303, 305 n. 10 (1976).
Since 1976 three malpractice insurers have left the Utah
market because of the medical malpractice crisis, including the
withdrawal of Aetna Life & Casualty in 1984.
Malpractice Legislation:
287, 288 n. 5 (1984).

See Note, Medical

Rx for Utah, 11 Utah J. Contemp. L.

Since malpractice insurance is directly

linked to provision of health care services, the withdrawal of
liability insurers threatens the withdrawal of health care providers and their services.
-16-

It was the specter of this medical malpractice crisis which
led the Federal District Court for Utah to conclude:
[T]he exclusion of minors and legally incompetent
persons from the general tolling provisions (Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-36) is rationally related to the stated
purpose of containing the malpractice insurance
crisis. That rationality is particularly evidenced by
the facts of the present case. Serious permanent
injuries to children are often cases of large potential damages. If the period in which such claims
could be brought were tolled until the young child
reached the age of majority, a heavy burden would be
placed on insurance carriers in evaluating and defending against the claim, establishing appropriate
reserve requirements, and setting rates. The percentage of medical malpractice claims brought by minors
is far from insignificant. Moreover, the uncertainty
inherent in tolling the period in which such claims
may be brought could drastically affect insurance
rates. . . .
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. at 158. Hence, section
78-14-4 is absolutely necessary to insure the continued availability of health care services in Utah by containing the malpractice insurance crisis.
2.

Section 78-14-4 is a necessary and reasonable means of
insuring the continued availability of health care
services to Utah citizens.

Because the Utah legislature recognized the absolute necessity of preventing the adverse effects and the rising incidence
and cost of medical malpractice claims from eliminating provision of health care services in Utah, the legislature responded
by enacting the Utah Health Care Medical Malpractice Act,
including its statute of limitations.
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the facts substantiating

the crisis were and continue to be more than evident.

Indeed,

it is naive to suggest that a medical malpractice crisis does
not exist.
The American Medical Association recently indicated that:
There is a crisis in professional
will get worse if comprehensive action
. . . . The huge continuing increases
suits and awards are significantly and
affecting the cost and availability of
the United States. (emphasis added.)

liability, it
is not taken
in premiums,
adversely
health care in

Response of the AMA to the ATLA Statements Regarding the
Professional Liability Crisis, AMA Task Force On Professional
Liability and Insurance (August 1985).
The medical malpractice crisis is particularly acute in
specialized areas of medical practice, such as neurosurgery.
These specialists are being forced to restrict their services
and reduce their high risk caseloads which ultimately reduces
the quality and availability of health care.
at 3.

AMA Responses,

Across all specialties, three times as many claims are

filed against physicians than were filed ten years ago.

AMA,

Socioeconomic Monitoring System (19 84); Malpractice, Balancing
the Issues, Ambulatory Care, p. 9, (June, 1985).
in every ten doctors is sued each year.

At least one

P. Danzon, The

Frequency And Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims 1 (1982).
The situation in Utah is even worse:

an average of 30 mal-

practice claims are presented per month.
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Utah Dept. of

Business Regulation Memorandum, Pre-litigation Medical
Malpractice Review (October, 1985 - April, 1986)
Accordingly, seventy percent of physicians now indicate
that they have altered their practice of medicine to protect
against lawsuits. AMA, Center for Health Policy Research,
April, 1985. Current estimates indicate that medical costs
related to professional liability, including defensive medicine, accounted for twenty percent to twenty-five percent of
the $69 billion spent on physicians' services in 1983 which
amounts to $13.8 to $17.3 billion.

National Health

Expenditures, 19 83; Health Care Financing And Review, Vol. 7,
No. 2, Winter 1984.

Increases in malpractice awards also add

to the already startling medical malpractice crisis.

See

Argument § 1(B) supra.
Furthermore, the extent of the current professional liability crisis is most accurately revealed by current data,
indicating that average expenditures for professional liability
insurance rose by 44.8% between 1982 and 1984. American
Medical Association, Center for Health Policy Research, 1985.
The figure is Utah is significantly greater:

Two of the major

Utah medical professional liability insurers more than doubled
premium rates for physicians and surgeons between 1984 and
1985.

State of Utah Insurance Department Medical Professional

Liability Insurance Premium Revision, The St. Paul Property &

-19-

Liability Insurance Company Rate Increase Filings, (December 7,
1984 and December 10, 1985) (reflecting a 109.5% increase from
1984 to 1985); State of Utah Insurance Department Medical
Professional Liability Insurance Premium Rate Revision, UMIA
Rate Increase Filings (January 27, 1984 and December 26, 1985)
(reflecting a 109% increase from 1984 to 1985).
The extraordinary liability crisis coupled with huge premium increases for physicians, especially high risk specialists
such as neurosurgeons is a problem for every physician and
every patient.

In addressing this issue, the Kansas Supreme

Court concluded:
. . . low risk practitioners need high risk
specialists in order to provide comprehensive care for
their patients. Were insurance coverage unavailable
for the specialists in high risk fields, the evidence
indicates these professional would either leave the
state or would soon quit the practice, causing a
general decline in the overall quality of health care
available. . . .
State ex rel. Schneider v. Ligget, 576 P.2d 221, 229 (Kan.
1978) .
The existing insurance crisis will be exacerbated and the
practice of specialized medicine might well become an uninsurable risk if the statute of limitations for medical malpractice
actions is tolled on such claims until an infant reaches
majority.

Therefore, § 78-14-4 is not only a reasonable means

of achieving legislative objectives, but it is also a necessary
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means of assuring Utah citizens of continued health care
services.
D.

Scott v. School Board of Granite School District Does
Not Invalidate the Medical Malpractice Statute of
Limitations as Applied to Minors' Claims.

Plaintiff's argument on appeal intimates that this Court
has declared the non-tolling of a statute of limitations unconstitutional, as applied to minors.
pp. 10-11.

Appellant's Brief,

In Scott v. School Board of Granite School

District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), the statutory provision at
issue was Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1977), the notice of claim
provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-1 et: seg. (1977).

Plaintiff suggests that the dictum

contained in the Court's opinion invalidated not only
§ 63-30-13, but also other provisions which limit the effect of
the general tolling provision for minor's claims as set forth
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36(1) (1977).

(Appellant's Brief

pp. 10-11).
However, Scott is not a case of constitutional dimension;
it is, rather, an example of judicial interpretation of
statutes to further the legislature's intent and objectives.
A line of Utah cases prior to Scott held that the tolling
provisions of § 78-12-36 did not excuse a minor's failure to
timely file the notice of claim required by § 63-30-13 before
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commencing an action against a political subdivision of the
state.

See e.g. Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435

(1973) .
In 1973, the Utah legislature amended Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-7-77, a notice of claim provision relating to certain
claims against cities or incorporated towns which was similar
in content and effect to § 63-30-13.

The amendment provided:

If the person for whom a claim is made is a minor,
then the claims covered by this section may be so
presented within the time limits specified above or
within one year after the person reaches the age of
majority, whichever is longer.
In Scott the Court found that this amendment, coupled with
the Legislature's enactment of the general tolling provision in
§ 78-12-36(1), made it "abundantly clear" that the Legislature's general intent at that time was to protect minor's
claims against governmental entities.

Scott, 568 P.2d at 748.

Given that legislative intent, and the similarities between the
two notice of claim provisions, the Court was unable to find
any reason for the 1973 Legislature's failure to similarly
amend § 63-30-13 and the minor's claim should be preserved.
The Court did not declare § 63-30-13 unconstitutional, but
simply overruled a prior line of cases in deference to what the
Court perceived to be a new expression of legislative grace in
favor of minors.
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The Scott decision is consistent with this Court's prior
rulings concerning judicial review of legislative enactments.
The Court has stated that its primary responsibility and purpose in interpreting statutory enactments is to give effect to
the underlying legislative intent.

Millett v. Clark Clinic

Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)-

The Court has also

stated that it will avoid constitutional questions wherever
possible:
The right and power of the judiciary to declare
whether legislative enactments exceed constitutional
limitations is to be exercised with considerable
restraint and in conformity with fundamental rules.
One such fundamental rule of long-standing is that
unnecessary decisions are to be avoided and that the
court should pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute only when such a determination is essential to
the decision in a case. . . .
Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980).
The Scott decision is consistent with these rules of
judicial review.

The decision interpreted and gave full effect

to the perceived legislative intent.

It did not, however,

invalidate the notice of claim statute, nor did the Court
review and pass upon the constitutionality of any other statutory provision not before the Court.

The Scott decision there-

fore has no effect beyond its own facts.
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POINT II
SECTION 78-14-4 IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY
PERMISSIBLE ENACTMENT.
A party who challenges a legislative enactment on constitutional grounds bears a heavy burden of proof.

Judicial review

of a properly enacted law begins with the strong presumption
that the law is constitutional.
1220, 1222 (Utah 1983).

State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d

This Court has consistently held that

it is not the function of the judiciary to second guess the
wisdom or propriety of legislation.
But the wisdom or propriety of the legislation is
not for us to consider . . . "there is, without doubt,
plenty of room, within the pale of the constitution,
for ill-advised legislation. . . . That is a matter
between the people and the representatives." . . .
Within the limits of the constitution it is the
prerogative of the legislature to control such
matters, and the fact that an act may be ill-advised
or unfortunate, if such it be, does not give rise to
an appeal from the legislature to the courts for correction. . . . Under our system of government it is
important that each branch thereof avoid infringement
upon the prerogatives of the other.
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement Sys. Bd. of Admin., 122
Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 599 (1952) [citations omitted]; see also
Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).

By

its own mandate this Court does not interfere with the legislature's exercise of its prerogative unless a constitutional
infringement is clearly established.
P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981).
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Zamora v. Draper, 635

A.

The Appropriate Standard of Review Is the Rational
Basis Standard.

In this appeal plaintiff challenges the constitutionality
of § 78-14-4 as applied to minors on two grounds:

(1) the pro-

vision violates Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution
relating to a litigant's right of access to the courts, and
(2) the provision violates state and federal guarantees of
equal protection of laws.

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-15.)

The rational basis standard of review is the appropriate
standard for deciding both of plaintiff's constitutional
challenges.

See Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 674 n. 14 (Utah

1984) (equal protection rational basis analysis applies to
review of rights guaranteed by Art. I, Sec. 11 of the Utah
Constitution).2

The majority of jurisdictions treat challenges under their
state "Open Courts Provision" in the same fashion as the
Utah forum. See Kite v. Campbell, 191 Cal. Rptr. 363, 367
(Cal. App. 1983); Licano v. Krausnick, 663 P.2d 1066, 1068
(Colo. App. 1983); Hartford Fire Ins. v. Lawrence, Drykes,
Goodenberger, 740 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1984); Chesewold
Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lamertson Const. Co., 462 A.2d 415,
422 (Del. 1983); Nelms v. Georgian Manor Condominiums
Ass'n. Inc., 312 S.E.2d 30 (Ga. 1984); Klier v. Catalano,
437 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Mass. 1982); Schultz v. Funk, 410
N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio 1979). Many courts have held that the
legislature may abolish a common law cause of action
regardless of the presence of an "Open Court" constitutional provision. See Hartford Fire Ins., supra. In any
event, the provision does not prohibit imposing reasonable
limits upon the time within which one must seek redress in
the court. See Phelan v. Hanft, 471 So. 2d 648 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985); Rosnick v. Marks, 357 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Neb.
1981); Neotzel v. Glascow, Inc., 487 A.2d 1372, 1378 (Pa.
1985); Walsh v. Gerving, 494 A.2d 543, 547 (R.I. 1985).
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The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the
Utah Constitution embody the same fundamental principle:
"Persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and
persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if
their circumstances were the same."
669.

Malan v. Lewis, supra, at

Moreover, state courts seeking to base decisions on pro-

visions of their own state constitutions are obliged to conduct
an analysis of their constitutions in the same fashion as a
constitutional inquiry under the federal constitution.

See

Nettikisimmons, Towards a Theory of State Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 46 Mont. L„ Rev. 261 (1985).
A statute may, however, treat groups differently and still
meet constitutional equal protection and access to the courts
requirements under constitutional analysis if:

(1) the law

applies equally to all persons within a class; and (2) the
statutory classifications and different treatment given the
classes have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of
the statute.

Malan v. Lewis, supra, at 670.

The rational basis standard of review stated above has been
used by this Court in all its prior reviews of the medical malpractice statute of limitations.

See e.g., Allen v.

Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981)
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(cited in Malan v. Lewis, supra at 670). It is also the standard of review used by nearly all other state appellate courts
which have reviewed the constitutionality of their own respective medical malpractice statutes.

See American Bank and Trust

Co. v. Community Hospital, 683 P.2d 670, 677 n. 10 (Cal. 1984)
(citing 23 states and 3 federal circuits which have applied the
rational basis standard of review to uphold the constitutionality of classifications, such as that at issue in the instant
case).
The "strict scrutiny" and "heightened scrutiny" standards
of review plaintiff urges the Court to adopt in this appeal are
not applied to legislation which does not create a "suspect
class" or affect a "fundamental constitutional right."
v. Lewis, supra at 674 n. 17.3

Malan

The United States District

Court for the District of Utah has already rejected the argument for applying a "heightened scrutiny" review to a minor's
constitutional challenge to the Utah medical malpractice
statute of limitations:
Unlike alienage, illegitimacy or gender, the class of
minors with medical malpractice claims does not
involve a fundamental interest or a classification of
a suspect character. . . .
The correct standard for equal protection
analysis to be applied in this case under both the
The "heightened scrutiny" analysis of such cases as Carson
v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980), relied on by plaintiff, has already come under attack by other appellate
courts. See e.g., Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330, 33 (8th
Cir. 1983) ("We are unpersuaded by the reasoning of Carson
and decline to follow it.")
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United States and Utah Constitutions is the rational
basis test,
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F.Supp. 152, 157 (D. Utah 1984) (citing
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); Brubaker v.
Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1984); American Bank and
Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 683 P.2d 670, 677 n. 10
(1984); Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30,
31 (Utah 1981) .
B.

Section 78-14-4 applies equally to the relevant class
and reasonably furthers legislative objectives.

The Statute of Limitations of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, Section 78-14-4, must be held to be a constitutional exercise of the Utah legislature's prerogative
unless plaintiff can clearly establish that the statute does
not meet the requirements of the rational basis standard of
review.

To satisfy the rational basis test, the statute must

first, apply equally to all members of the created class.
Malan v. Lewis, supra.

The class created and protected by the

Act is health care providers.

See Allen v. Intermountain

Health Care, Inc., 634 P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981) ("The test . . .
is whether there exists a rational basis to treat health care
providers differently from other alleged tort feasors
. . . .")

Section 78-14-4 applies equally to all health care

providers and therefore complies with the first prong of the
rational basis test.

The statute also treats equally the

affected group, those persons including minors who have
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personal injury claims against health care providers.
Argument § 1(A) and (B), supra.

See

The classification of minors

who are tort victims of health care providers and minors who
are victims of other tort-feasors is rationally related to the
legitimate state interest of controlling malpractice insurance
costs and ensuring continued health care services in this
state.

See generally Redish, Legislative Response to the

Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:

Constitutional

Implication, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 759 (1977).
Second, to satisfy equal protection review, the different
treatment afforded the protected class must have a "reasonable
tendency" to further the legislative objective.

Malan v.

Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984).
In Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30
(Utah 1981), this Court reviewed the legislative objective
behind the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and held that the
Act and its statute of limitations are constitutional:
It is therefore seen that the Act was premised
upon the need to protect and insure the continued
availability of health care services to the public,
and not (as asserted by plaintiff) to shield insurance
companies from legitimate claims. The legislature
exercised its discretionary prerogative in determining
that the shortening of the statute of limitations
(along with requiring notice of intention to sue),
would insure the continued availability of adequate
health care services.
635 P.2d at 32..; see Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1977).
Judicial review of legislation does not include a reevaluation of the facts the legislature could have considered
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to determine the necessity for the enactment.

The constitu-

tionality of a measure under the equal protection clause does
not depend on a court's hindsight assessment of the empirical
success or failure of the measure's provisions. As Justice
Brennan explained in Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456, 466 (1981):

"whether in fact the Act will promote

the [legislative objectives] is not the question:

the Equal

Protection Clause is satisfied by our conclusion that the
[state] Legislature could rationally have decided" that the
means chosen will promote the legislative objectives.
(Emphasis added.) Where there was evidence before the
Legislature which, if believed to be true, supported the creation of the statutory classification, a plaintiff cannot
invalidate the statute by tendering evidence to support an
argument that the Legislature may have been mistaken.

Clover-

leaf, 449 U.S. at 466.
The reports produced and relied on by defendant, cited
herein, provide ample support for the Legislature's belief that
tort reform in the medical malpractice area was and is needed
to insure the continued availability of quality health care,
and that the statute of limitations for medical malpractice
claims would further that objective.
concluded.

In Allen this Court so

635 P.2d at 31-32.

The Federal District Court for Utah stated that the burden
of weighing the need to contain malpractice insurance costs and
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the medical malpractice crisis in general and thereby to ensure
the availability of health care services against the competing
interests of minors and mental incompetents whose parents or
guardians fail to timely initiate an action is a problem to be
handled by the legislature, not the courts.

Hargett, 598

F. Supp. at 158. The reasons for leaving the balancing process
to the legislature are important:
[A]ny possible harm that may be suffered by a minor
whose parents or guardians fail to initiate the action
against a potential tortious wrongdoer within the
appropriate time period may be outweighed by the
chaos, uncertainty, and severe prejudice which will
occur to those accused of tortious conduct, their
insurance carriers, and ultimately to the insurance
carriers rate payers when lawsuits are permitted to be
initiated decades after the occurrence of the incident
giving rise thereto. Before such a sweeping change is
made the question of "reserve requirements" imposed on
insurance carriers and the resulting effect on insurance rates as well as many other issues must be
addressed. The Legislature, not the courts, is the
proper forum for the resolution of such issues.
(Emphasis added.)
De Santis v. Yaw, 434 A.2d 1273, 1279 (Pa. Super. 1981).
Indeed, in almost all areas, the law expects the parents or
guardians will look after and protect the child's interest.
Absent the presence of a fundamental right, parents are
expected and allowed to exercise broad decision-making
authority over their children.

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622

(1979); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979).
Based upon sound and well-reasoned authorities, appropriate
principles of judicial review, and legislative objectives
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underlying the Act and its statute of limitations, it is evident that § 78-14-4 complies with federal and state guarantees
of equal protection of laws and does not deny this plaintiff
access to the courts. Other jurisdictions which have analyzed
equal protection and due process attacks by minor plaintiffs
against medical malpractice statutes of limitations have
reached similar results.4

See e.g., Donabedian v Manzer, 200 Cal. Rptr. 597 (Cal.
App. 1 Dist. 1984); Kite v. Campbell, 191 Cal. Rptr. 363
(App. 1983) (statute providing that medical malpractice
actions by a minor must be commenced within three years
from the date of the alleged wrongful act did not deny a
minor's right to due process under law; as a matter of constitutional law, a statute of limitation is remedial in
nature and does not destroy fundamental rights); Wheeler v.
Lenski, 658 P.2d 1056 (Kan. App. 1983) (statute which
shortens period of limitation for minors and incapacitated
persons in medical malpractice actions did not violate
equal protection or due process); Petri v. Smith, 453 A.2d
342 (Pa. Super. 1982) (the settled rule is that it is not
violative of any constitutional rights to hold minors bound
equally with adults to the prescribed statutory periods
within which legal causes of action may be brought); Reese
v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hospital, 403 So.2d 158 (Ala. 1981)
(statute of limitations did not violate due process and
equal protection provisions of state or federal constitutions on ground that statute created minors injured through
medical malpractice differently from minor victims of other
torts); Thomas v. Niemann, 397 So.2d 90 (Ala. 1981)
(minor's medical malpractice action was barred by the
statute of limitations and was properly dismissed); Johnson
v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980)
(time limitation effecting medical malpractice claim for
death of a minor child was not contrary to due process and
equal protection); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 413 N.E.2d 891
(Ind. 1980) (court held that the legislature was not constitutionally mandated to suspend application of statutes
of limitation in cases of infancy or incapacity and dismissed appeal which challenged constitutionality of statute
of limitations of medical malpractice act).
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CONCLUSION
The district court applied sound and time-honored precedents of this Court to conclude that equal treatment of minors
and adults under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was a
constitutionally valid exercise of legislative prerogative.
The rational basis standard of review this Court and nearly all
other state appellate courts have applied to review the constitutionality of medical malpractice statutes clearly supports
that conclusion.
The increase in the number and size of medical malpractice
claims brought against health care providers, particularly
those practicing in specialized areas of medicine, during the
last ten years demonstrates unequivocally that the
Legislature's concern about the future cost and availability of
professional liability insurance was indeed well founded.
Since 1976, insurance rates in Utah and throughout the country
have skyrocketed.

In December, 1984, Aetna Life and Casualty,

for years Utah's most prominent professional liability insurance carrier, withdrew from the Utah market.

The Legislature

addressed the issue again in 1985 and 1986 because every indication is that the situation will worsen, not improve, in the
future.
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The action of the Utah Legislature in enacting the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act and its statute of limitations is
an appropriate response to a legitimate and real concern.

It

is, after all, the public which ultimately pays the cost of
professional liability insurance and benefits from the continued availability of such coverage when injuries are suffered.

In the furtherance of that objective, the Legislature

reasonably required all persons, including minors, to present
claims timely, which is essential to give insurers a reasonable
opportunity to reduce losses in an extremely volatile insurance
market.

The Legislature also perceived that in medicine where

advances in procedures, knowledge and technology occur so
rapidly, a long delay in the prosecution of an action seriously
and detrimentally affects a health care provider's ability to
defend care that may have been standard when rendered, but
which may seem ineffectual or even harmful in retrospect.
Respondents respectfully urge the Court to affirm the decision of the court below thereby reaffirming its long-standing
position that "under our system of government, it is important
that each branch thereof avoid infringement on the prerogatives
of the other."

Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement Sys. Bd.

of Admin., 122 Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 599 (1952).
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DATED this 0-

day of

, 1986
NOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Elliot/ty. Williams
Attorneys for Defendant
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STATE OF UTAH

SUZANNE LEE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 68963
vs.
RULING
DR. LYNN GAUFIN,
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court, under Rule
2.8, on the motion of Defendant seeking judgment on the
pleadings.

The Court has reviewed the file, reconsidered

the memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of counsel,
and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the following:
RULING
1.

The ruling of this Court granting said motion

on October 9, 1985 is hereby confirmed and reinstated.
The Court is of the opinion that the case of Scott
vs. School Board of Granite School District, 568 P2d 746, is
not controlling.

Sections 78-14-4(1) & (2) UCA were enacted

subsequent to the decision in the Scott case and such sections
clearly demonstrate the legislative intent to withdraw the
protection of causes of action of minors which may have previously been afforded by reason of Section 78-12-36(1) UCA.
The stated legislative purpose to protect and insure the
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continued availability of health care services to the public
by including causes of actions of minors within those causes
affected by the shorter period of limitations does not appear
to the Court to be so arbitrary or unreasonable as to constitutionally invalidate Sections 78-14-4(1) & (2) UCA 1953 as
amended.
2.

The proposed order in conformity with the above

ruling heretofore submitted and served on October 16, 1985,
has been executed by the Court this date and accordingly filed
with the Clerk of the Court.
Dated this c£7 ~

day 0 f

/^yCyy^C^^

1985.

BY THE COURT:

Cullen ]y. Christensen, Judge
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ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUZANNE LEE and NATHAN LEE
GARZA, through his guardian,
SUZANNE LEE,

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Plaintiffs,

DR. LYNN GAUFIN,
Civil No. 68963
Defendant.

The Motion of defendant, Dr. Lynn Gaufin, for Judgment on
the Pleadings came on regularly for disposition pursuant to
Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts, the
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, presiding, and the Court having
reviewed the Memoranda and pleadings on file herein and being
fully advised in the premises, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion of defendant,
Dr. Lynn Gaufin, for Judgment on the Pleadings be and the same
is hereby granted and judgment in favor of the defendant and
against plaintiffs be and the same is hereby entered for the

reason that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of
limitations set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, as amended).
DATED this >//—

day of Oetefensr, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

CULLEN/^T CHRISTENSEN
District Judge
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

ss.

CORINNE M. GLASS
, being duly sworn,
says that he/she is employed in the law offices of Snow,
Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for defendant
herein; that he/she served the attached Judgment on the
Pleadings
(Case No.
68963
,
Utah
County)
upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Attorneys for Plaintiffs;
G. Steven Sullivan
Robert J. Debry
Robert J. Debry & Associates
965 East 4800 South, Suite No. 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

and causino^the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the \\p-wv day of
October
, 198 5 .

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this \ \ffi^ day^ of
October
, 198 5 .

[iU K^^Ocrn,

My Commission Expires:

NOTARY\PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid, to:
David M. Jorgensen
Robert J. DeBry
Robert J. Debry & Associates
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
on the 2nd day of June, 1986.
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